**Contention one is framework:** **The role of the ballot is to vote for the debater who forwards the best advocacy for improving the material conditions for people with disabilities.**

Debate should deal with questions of real-world consequences—we should focus on the material conditions that affect people. **Curry 14[[1]](#footnote--1)**

**Despite the pronouncement of debate as an** activity and **intellectual exercise pointing to the real world consequences of dialogue, thinking, and** (personal) **politics when addressing** issues of **racism, sexism**, economic disparity, global **conflicts, and death**, **many of the discussions** concerning these ongoing challenges to humanity **are fixed to a paradigm which sees the adjudication of material disparities and sociological realities as the conquest of one ideal theory over the other**. In “Ideal Theory as Ideology,” Charles **Mills outlines the problem** contemporary theoretical-performance styles in policy debate and **value-weighing in Lincoln-Douglass are confronted with in their attempts to get at the** concrete **problems in** our **societie**s. At the outset, Mills concedes that “ideal theory applies to moral theory as a whole (at least to normative ethics as against metaethics); **[s]ince ethics deals** by definition **with normative**/prescriptive/evaluative **issues, [it is set] against factual**/descriptive **issues**.” At the most general level, **the** conceptual **chasm between** what emerges as ***actual* problems** in the world (**e.g.: racism, sexism**, poverty, disease, **etc.) and how we frame such problems *theoretically***—**the assumptions and shared ideologies we depend upon for our problems to be heard** and accepted **as a** worthy “**problem” by an audience—[this] is the most obvious call for an anti-ethical paradigm**, **since such** a paradigm **insists on the actual as the basis of what can be considered normatively**. Mills, however, describes this chasm as a problem of an ideal-as-descriptive model which argues that for any actual-empirical-observable social phenomenon (P), an ideal of (P) is necessarily a representation of that phenomenon. In the idealization of a social phenomenon (P), one “necessarily has to abstract away from certain features” of (P) that is observed before abstraction occurs. **This gap between what is *actual* (in the world), and what is represented by theories and politics of debaters proposed in rounds threatens any real discussions about the concrete nature of oppression and** the **racist** economic **structures which necessitate** **tangible policies** and reorienting changes in our value orientations. As Mills states: “What distinguishes ideal theory is the reliance on idealization to the exclusion, or at least marginalization, of the actual,” so what we are seeking to resolve on the basis of “thought” is in fact incomplete, incorrect, or ultimately irrelevant to the actual problems which our “theories” seek to address. **Our attempts to situate social disparity cannot** simply **appeal to the ontologization of social phenomenon**—**meaning we cannot suggest that** the various **complexities of social problems** (which are constantly emerging and undisclosed beyond the effects we observe) **are totalizable by any one** set of **theories within an ideological frame be it** our most cherished notions of **Afro-pessimism, feminism,** Marxism, **or the like**. At best, **theoretical endorsements make us aware of sets of actions to address** ever developing **problems in our** empirical **world**, **but** even **this awareness does not command us to *only* do X,** **but rather do X and the other ideas which compliment the material conditions addressed by the action X**. **As a whole, debate** (policy and LD) **neglects the need to do X** in order **to remedy our cast-away-ness among** **our ideological tendencies** and politics. How then do we pull ourselves from this seeming ir-recoverability of thought in general and in our endorsement of socially actualizable values like that of the living wage? It is my position that Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.’s thinking about the need for a living wage was a unique, and remains an underappreciated, resource in our attempts to impose value reorientation (be it through critique or normative gestures) upon the actual world. In other words, King aims to reformulate the values which deny the legitimacy of the living wage, and those values predicated on the flawed views of the worker, Blacks, and the colonized (dignity, justice, fairness, rights, etc.) used to currently justify the living wages in under our contemporary moral parameters.

#### And, as a judge, you are an educator and have an obligation to evaluate oppression first in order to preserve the value of debate as a whole. Smith ’13[[2]](#footnote-0)

“It will be uncomfortable, it will be hard, and it will require continued effort but the necessary step in fixing this problem, like all problems, is the community as a whole admitting that such a problem with many “socially acceptable” choices exists in the first place. Like all systems of **social control**, the reality of racism **in debate is constituted by** the singular **choices that** institutions, **coaches**, and students **make** on a weekly basis. I have watched countless rounds where competitors attempt to win by rushing to **abstractions** to **distance the conversation from the** material **reality** that black **debaters** are forced to **deal with every day.** One of the students I coached, who has since graduated after leaving debate, had an adult judge write out a ballot that concluded by “hypothetically” defending my student being lynched at the tournament. Another debate concluded with a young man defending that we can kill animals humanely, “just like we did that guy Troy Davis”. **Community norms** would **have competitors** do intellectual gymnastics or **make up rules to accuse** black **debaters of breaking to escape hard conversations** but as someone who understands that experience, **the only constructive strategy is to acknowledge the reality of the oppressed**, engage the discussion from the perspective of authors who are black and brown, **and** then find strategies to **deal with the issues at hand.** It hurts to see competitive seasons come and go and have high school students and judges spew the same hateful things you expect to hear at a Klan rally. **A student should not**, when presenting an advocacy that aligns them with the oppressed, **have to justify why oppression is bad. Debate is not just a game, but a learning environment with liberatory potential.** Even if the form debate gives to a conversation is not the same you would use to discuss race in general conversation with Bayard Rustin or Fannie Lou Hamer, that is not a reason we have to strip that conversation of its connection to a reality that black students cannot escape. Current **coaches** and competitors alike **dismiss concerns of** racism and **exclusion, won’t teach other students anything** about identity in debate **other than** how **to shut down** competitors who engage in **alternative** styles and **discourses**, and refuse to engage in those discussions even outside of a tournament setting. A conversation on privilege and identity was held at a debate institute I worked at this summer and just as any theorist of privilege would predict it was the heterosexual, white, male staff members that either failed to make an appearance or stay for the entire discussion. No matter how talented they are, we have to remember that the students we work with are still just high school aged children. **If those who are responsible for participants and** the creation of accessible **norms won't risk a better future** for our community, **it becomes harder to explain to students who look up to them why risking such an endeavor is necessary.”**

#### And, Public policy often reproduces values that constrain and exclude people with disabilities – if society ignores the needs of people with disabilities, they cannot be truly free – it’s important to consider the values embedded in our policies to resist hegemonic categories of disability. **Imrie** **14**[[3]](#footnote-1)

Harvey (2008:38) observes that the right to the city is increasingly the preserve of private interests, characterised by elite groups controlling who can gain access to, and consume, different parts of the urban environment. Public policy is entwined with the (re-)production of elite spaces, or places that reflect the primacy of market values, and the commodification of the public realm. Such commodification extends to the valuation of the body, and the interplay between bodily aesthetics, corporeal performance and processes of inclusion or exclusion from public goods, services and spaces. The embodied nature of the consumer, for consumer is what people are regarded as, is based on a reductive understanding of the body that fails to recognise, in any significant sense, corporeal complexity and the omnipresence of impairment in society. Spaces, and the places that ensue, are vested with disabling values, and shaped by processes of disablement that, far from freeing up disabled people [with disabilities] , require them to conform in ways that constrain rather than enable them. This feels a long way from liberal ideals of freedom and, for many disabled people, being required to ‘self-activate’, and take responsibility for the limitations imposed by impairment is the reality of emergent neo-liberalising policy regimes. From housing to transport and urban public space, policy reflects a (re-)conceptualisation of the citizen that is shifting from what Kumar (2012:363) describes as collective-based understandings of citizenship to more individual ones. This revolves around the marketisation of everyday life, in which the facilitation of freedom requires one to gain access to, and participate in, the market, while, simultaneously, freeing oneself from the shackles of the state. The difficulty for many disabled people is at least twofold, one, that their participation in markets requires a ‘market presence’, including access to jobs, money and resources, which many do not have, and, two, in a world where impaired bodies are devalued, or nonrecognised, it is unclear how disabled people [with disabilities] can be rendered ‘free’. This is compounded by the embedded nature of disabling discourse that fails to recognise the intrinsic nature of impairment in society, and that operates with a reductive logic that measures bodily capacity, hence capability, through the lens of economic criteria, such as performance, productivity and efficiency. The elision between impairment and pejorative representations of the body, relating to lack of capacity, inefficiency and non-productivity, is part of socio-cultural conditioning of/about corporeality that constrains the nature of market provision or, at least, does not encourage responsiveness to the needs of disabled people. For many providers of goods and services, disability is an irrelevant category, and disabled people do not, in their views, constitute the basis of/for a market. It is rare to find, for instance, house-builders that have knowledge of impairment, or are likely to design a dwelling to incorporate the micro-designed features to enable ease of use by people with different types of mobility and sensory impairments. This returns to the focus of the chapter, and the book, that is, disabling spatialities and the role of policy regimes in the (re-)production of disablism in society. Why is disabling discourse with(-in) spatial practice so resistant to change? In spatial practice, such as architecture and planning, disability is underpinned by a spatial logic of separation that is rarely a focus of a body politics or a progressive politics of well-being. For Lefebvre ( 1991 ), and others, the consequential socio-spatial marginality of particular groups, such as disabled people [with disabilities], needs to be described, documented and politicised as part of the rights of citizens to exercise autonomy, and to be empowered not only to imagine the possibilities of alternative, counter-mainstream, spatialities, but to enact them by being able to access, and influence, the means by which spatial relations are conceived, conceptualised and translated into place-based experiences. The realisability of a radical politics of space, in which impairment and a critique of disabling spatialities is at its heart, is not easily achievable, yet is core to the task of creating a non-disabling society. Despite much research about disability and impairment, we are still at formative stages in understanding the complexities of disabling socio-spatial formations. There are some instructive works for guidance, including Emery ( 2009 ) who outlines how Deaf communities draw attention to the phonocentric nature of citizenship that assumes that hearing is normal. In doing so, they highlight how spaces are socially constructed around ‘hearing places’ that exclude those that do not hear. Likewise, vision impaired groups have described, in the case of shared space, and other places, the dominance of visuality in shaping spatial relations (Guide Dogs for the Blind Association, 2006 ). Documentation of such experiences is important to show how impairment interacts with(-in) socially constructed spaces as part of disablement in society. In and of itself, such documentation of hegemonic spaces, and their crafting around the ‘body normal’, is insufficient, and a politics of disablement must, simultaneously, be a politics of space that has regard to the different ways in which disablism is manifest in and through place. This politics is necessarily one of resistance to hegemonic conceptions, representations and categories of/about disability and the body, and will assert the normalcy of impairment, or the body as a dynamic and transient subject, never fixed nor stable.

#### And, Social constructions of disability are the root cause of other forms of oppression. Challenging these assumptions is key – true politics is impossible within the paradigm of ableism. **Siebers** **10**[[4]](#footnote-2)

These two episodes may seem worlds apart, their resemblance superficial. The first turns on questions of aesthetic taste. The second is about political inclusion. But they express with equal power the current struggles in the United States about the ideal of a common culture. Do certain kinds of bodies have greater civil rights than others? Which is more important, the baby's body or the mother's body? Who should bear the cost to make public buildings accessible to people with disabilities? Who gets to have sex with whom? Whose bloodlines will Americans claim as their birthright? These are political questions for the simple reason that they determine who gains membership, and who does not, in the body politic, but the apparent oddity of the culture wars consists in the fact that the debates over these questions have used aesthetic rather than political arguments. The flash points in the battle are not on the senate floor or in the chambers of the powerful but in classrooms, museums, theaters, concert halls, and other places of culture. Opposing sides tend not to debate political problems directly, focusing instead on the value of reading certain books, the decency of photographs, paintings, and statues, the offensiveness of performances and gestures, the bounds of pornography, the limits of good taste. The culture wars are supposed to be more about who gets into the culture than who has culture, and yet it is difficult to raise one issue without raising the other. Aesthetics tracks the emotions that some bodies feel in the presence of other bodies, but aesthetic feelings of pleasure and disgust are difficult to separate from political feelings of acceptance and rejection. The oppression of women, gays and lesbians, people with disabilities, blacks, and other ethnic groups often takes the form of an aesthetic judgment, though a warped one, about their bodies and the emotions elicited by them. Their actions are called sick, their appearance judged obscene or disgusting, their mind depraved, their influence likened to a cancer attacking the healthy body of society. Such metaphors not only bring the idea of the disabled body to mind but represent the rejected political body as disabled in some way. The culture wars appear to be as much about the mental competence to render judgment, the capacity to taste, and the physical ability to experience sensations as about a variety of controversial judgments, tastes, and feelings. They are as much about the shapes of the individual bodies accepted or rejected by the body politic as about the imagination of a common culture. The status of disability, then, is not just one controversy among others in the American culture wars. Disability is in one way or another the key concept by which the major controversies at the heart of the culture wars are presented to the public sphere, and through which the voting public will eventually render its decisions on matters both political and aesthetic. For to listen to opposing sides, the culture wars are about nothing more or less than the collective health of the United States. The culture wars not only represent minority groups as mentally and physically disabled-and demand their exclusion from the public sphere as a result-they reject works of art that present alternatives to the able body. Only by understanding that health is the underlying theme of the culture wars may we understand that thes,e two trends are related. The most scandalous artists in recent controversies about arts funding, for example, give their works an organic dimension that alludes to bodies gone awry, and these allusions are largely responsible for their shock value. They summon an aesthetic revulsion equivalent to the disgust felt by many persons in face-to-face encounters with people with disabilities, thereby challenging the ideal of a hygienic and homogeneous community.' Karen Finley's avant-garde performances confront the audience with a spectacle of errant body fluids: spermatozoaic alfalfa sprouts and excremental chocolate ooze over her body. In one performance, Lamb of God Hotel, she plays Aggie, a woman using a wheelchair having her diaper changed. Andres Serrano's notorious Piss Christ immerses a day-glow crucifix in a vat of the artist's urine, capturing the startling contradiction of Christianity's all-too-human son of God defiled by a mortal body and its waste fluids. Other photographs by Serrano present abstract expressionist patterns composed of blood and semen, stilllifes arranged with human and animal cadavers, and mug shots of the homeless, criminal, and aged. Robert Mapplethorpe's most memorable photographs capture the homoerotic body and serve it up to a largely heterosexual population. Perhaps his most outrageous work is a self-portrait revealing a bullwhip stuck up his rectum. It summons ideas of the devil as well as S/M practices, of course, but it also presents the image a man who has grown a tail, invoking a body whose deformed shape is less or more than human. These stunning works make a contribution to the history of art by assaulting aesthetic dictates that ally beauty to harmonious form, balance, hygiene, fluidity of expression, and genius. But their shock value owes less to their quibbling with certain aesthetic principles than to the bodies and organic materials presented by them. They represent flash points in the culture wars not only because they challenge how aesthetic culture should be defined but also because they attack the body images used to determine who has the right to live in society. People with disabilities elicit feelings of discomfort, confusion, and resentment because their bodies refuse cure, defy normalization, and threaten to contaminate the rest of society. We display bodies objectionable to the body politic, disrupting the longstanding association between instances of aesthetic form and what Fredric Jameson calls the political unconscious. The political unconscious, I want to argue, enforces a mutual identification between forms of appearance, whether organic, aesthetic, or architectural, and ideal images of the body politic. It accounts for the visceral and defensive response to any body found to disturb society's established image of itself. Jameson, of course, defines the political unconscious as a collective impulse that situates the experience of the human group as the absolute horizon of all interpretation. In fact, the existence of the group is for him so much a part of human experience that he considers the consciousness of individuality itself as a symptom of estrangement from collective life. Notice, however, that the political unconscious has no content other than its ability to reference human community as a formal totality. It exists to ponder social totality, but what it refuses to ponder a vision of community as less than perfect. To conceive social totality at the level of form envisions both objects of human production and bodies as symbols of wholeness. The political unconscious establishes the principle of totality as the methodological standard of all human interpretation. It installs the image of an unbroken community as the horizon of thought, requiring that ideas of incompetent, diseased, defective, or incomplete community be viewed as signs of alienation. This means that the very idea of disability signals the triumph of fallen or defective consciousness, despite the fact that there are no real, existing communities of human beings unaffected by the presence of injury, disease, defect, and incompleteness. In short, the political unconscious is a social imaginary designed to eradicate disability. The political unconscious upholds a delicious ideal of social perfection by insisting that any public body be flawless. It also displaces manifestations of disability from collective consciousness, we will see, through concealment, cosmetic action, motivated forgetting, and rituals of sympathy and pity. Advertisements, media images, buildings, and habitats work to assert the coherence and integrity of society, while public actions like telethons and media representations of heroic cripples mollify the influence of disability. Bodies that cannot be subsumed by ritual and other public action represent a blemish on the face of society, and they must be eliminated, apparently whatever the cost. Diane DeVries provides a familiar account, unfortunately, of the political unconscious at work, of the visceral disgust and accompanying violence often directed at people with disabilities. She reveals that observers of the disabled body often feel compelled to fly into action, to cure or kill the ungainly sight before their eyes. De Vries was born with short arms, no hands, and no legs: once when I was a kid, I was in a wagon and we were in this trailer park, and some kid came up to me with a knife. He said, "Aw, you ain't got no arms, you ain't got no legs, and now you're not gonna have no head." He held me right there, by the neck, and had a little knife. It was one of those bratty kids that do weird things. (Cited by Fine and Asch 48).

#### And, The liberal subject constituted by the traditional ethics is assumed to be able-bodied – a focus on people with disabilities is key. **Breckenridge 1**[[5]](#footnote-3)

Disability studies teaches that an assumed able body is crucial to the smooth operation of traditional theories of democracy, citizenship, subjectivity, beauty, and capital. By assuming that the normative human is an able-bodied adult, for example, liberal theory can conflate political or economic interests with desires, political representation with having a voice in policy-making, social organization with voluntary association, and so on. Liberal theory naturalizes the political by making it personal. And the “person” at the center of the traditional liberal theory is not simply an individual locus of subjectivity (however psychologically fragmented, incoherent, or troubled). He is an able-bodied locus of subjectivity, one whose unskilled labor may be substituted freely for the labor of other such individuals, one who can imagine [themselves] himself largely self-sufficient because almost everything conspires to help him [them] take his [their] enabling body for granted (even when he is scrambling for the means of subsistence). However, the mere possibility of a severely cognitively disabled adult citizen disrupts the liberal equations of representation and voice, desire and interest. Advocacy for the severely cognitively disabled is not a matter of voicing their demands. More generally, the intricate practical dialectics of dependence and independence in the lives of many disabled people unsettle ideals of social organization as freely chosen expressions of mutual desire.

**Contention two is what our mental health care system looks like**—When Alexander Pean went to the hospital he was expecting treatment for bipolar disorder—Instead he got shot in the chest. **Rosenthal 2/13[[6]](#footnote-4)**

When doctors and nurses arrived at Room 834 just after 11 a.m., a college student admitted to the hospital hours earlier lay motionless on the floor, breathing shallowly, a sheet draped over his body. A Houston police officer with a cut on his head was being helped onto a stretcher, while another hovered over the student. Blood smeared the floor and walls. “What happened?” asked Dr. Daniel Arango, a surgical resident at the hospital, St. Joseph Medical Center. The student, 26-year-old Alan **Pean**, **had come to the hospital for treatment of possible**[**bipolar disorder**](http://health.nytimes.com/health/guides/disease/bipolar-disorder/overview.html?inline=nyt-classifier), accidentally striking several cars while pulling into the parking lot. **Kept overnight** for monitoring of minor injuries, **he never saw a psychiatrist and became increasingly delusional**. He sang and danced naked in his room, occasionally drifting into the hall. **When two nurses coaxed him into a gown, he refused to have it fastened**. **Following protocol, a nurse summoned security**, **even though he was not aggressive or threatening**. **Soon, from inside the room, there was shouting, sounds of a scuffle and a loud pop**. During an altercation, **two** off-duty Houston police officers, moonlighting as **security guards**, had shocked Mr. Pean with a [Taser](http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/s/stun_guns/index.html?inline=nyt-classifier), **fired a bullet into his chest**, then handcuffed him. “I thought of the hospital as a beacon, a safe haven,” said Mr. Pean, who survived the wound just millimeters from his heart last Aug. 27. “I can’t quite believe that I ended up shot.”

**And**, This is not an isolated incident across the country people with disabilities are being shot by overly armed hospital security workers. **Rosenthal 2/13[[7]](#footnote-5)**

Like Mr. Pean, **patients seeking help at hospitals across the country have instead been injured or killed by those guarding the institutions**. **Medical centers are not required to report such encounters, so little data is available and** health **experts suspect** that some **cases go unnoticed**. Police blotters, court documents and government health reports have identified more than a dozen in recent years. They have occurred as **more and more American hospitals are** **arming guards with guns** and Tasers, setting off a fierce debate among health care officials about whether such steps — along with greater reliance on law enforcement or military veterans — improve safety or endanger patients. **The same day Mr. Pean was shot, a patient with**[**mental health**](http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/health/diseasesconditionsandhealthtopics/mentalhealthanddisorders/index.html?inline=nyt-classifier)**problems** [**was shot** by](http://fox8.com/2015/08/27/police-man-shot-after-taking-security-officers-taser-in-hospital-emergency-room/) an off-duty police officer working security **at a hospital in Garfield Heights**, **Ohio.** **Last month, a hospital security**[**officer shot a patient**](http://www.campussafetymagazine.com/article/hospital_security_officer_shoots_patient_after_struggle) **with bipolar illness in Lynchburg**, **Va**. Two psychiatric patients died, one in Utah, another in Ohio, after guards repeatedly shocked them with Tasers. In Pennsylvania and Indiana, hospitals have been disciplined by government health officials or opened inquiries after guards used stun guns against patients, including a woman bound with restraints in bed.

**And**, this problem is massive and growing, over half of hospitals arm their security staff with handguns and the trend only points to the problem getting worse. **Rosenthal 2/13[[8]](#footnote-6)**

To protect their corridors, **52 percent of medical centers reported that their security personnel carried handguns** and 47 percent said they used Tasers, according to a 2014 [national survey. **That was**](http://ihssf.org/PDF/weaponsuseamonghosptialsecuritypersonnel2014.pdf)**more than double**[**estimates from studies**](http://www.hfmmagazine.com/display/HFM-news-%20article.dhtml?dcrPath=/templatedata/HF_Common/NewsArticle/data/HFM/Magazine%20/2011/Oct/1011HFM_FEA_survey)**just three years before.** Institutions that prohibit them argue that such weapons — and **security guards not adequately trained to work in medical settings** — **add** a dangerous element in **an already tense environment**. They say many other steps can be taken to address problems, particularly with people who have a mental illness. Massachusetts General Hospital in Boston, for example, sends some of its security officers through the state police academy, but the strongest weapon they carry is pepper spray, which has been used only 11 times in 10 years. In New York City’s public hospital system, which runs several of the 20 busiest emergency rooms in the country, security personnel carry nothing more than plastic wrist restraints. (Like many other hospitals, the system coordinates with the local police for crises its staff cannot handle.) “Tasers and **guns send a bad message in a health care facility**,” said Antonio D. Martin, the system’s executive vice president for security. “**I have some concerns** about even having uniforms **because I think that could agitate some patients**.”

**Furthermore**, there is a pathetic standard for training that these workers have to go through, and hospital security officers are not medical professionals trained in the situation but rather workers who more often deal with violent situations. **Rosenthal 2/13[[9]](#footnote-7)**

**The two off-duty officers had signed on with Criterion Healthcare Security**, a four-year-old staffing agency based in Tennessee whose executives had previously managed prisons and owned gyms. **Their training at St. Joseph consisted of an orientation and online instruction, which investigators found inadequate**. **“The facility had no clear guidance for the role, duties and responsibilities of the police officers they employ to provide security services,”** the Medicare investigators’ report said. Like many other **security firms**, Criterion **encourage**s **applications from those** with law enforcement or military backgrounds, **who are trained to use weapons and to deal with volatile situations. But working in health care settings requires a different mind-set**, security experts emphasize “If they come from law enforcement or the military, I ask them directly, ‘How would you respond differently here than if you encountered a criminal on a street in L.A. or when you are kicking down a door in Iraq?’” said Scott Martin, the security director at the University of California, Irvine, Medical Center. “**You have to send the message that these are patients, they’re sick, the mental health population has rights — and you need to be sensitive to that**.”

**And**, The mere presence of guns is bad in facilities that need to focus on mental health, and are more likely to make the situation worse then actually protect anyone. **Rosenthal 2/13[[10]](#footnote-8)**

**Many mental health professionals strongly object to weapons in hospitals**, saying **they have numerous other means — from talk therapy to cloth restraints and seclusion rooms to quick-acting shots of**[**sedatives**](http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/health/diseasesconditionsandhealthtopics/sedatives/index.html?inline=nyt-classifier)**— to subdue patients if they pose a danger**. State mental health facilities typically do not allow guns or Tasers on their premises; even police officers are asked to check weapons at the door. (Twenty-three percent of shootings in emergency rooms involved someone grabbing a gun from a security officer,[according to a study](http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/22998757) by Dr. Gabor Kelen, director of emergency medicine at Johns Hopkins Medical School.) Uniforms and **weapons** may, in fact, **exacerbate delusions, since many** psychotic patients **are paranoid and**, like Alan Pean, **believe they are being pursued**. Anthony O’Brien, a researcher at the University of Auckland, in New Zealand, said, “**That’s not a good thing, pointing something that looks like a gun at a patient with mental health issues**.” When the two Houston officers arrived on St. Joseph’s eighth floor, they headed for Room 834. Unannounced, and unaccompanied by doctors, nurses or social workers, they went in, the door closing behind them.

**Also**, the poor screening standards from security firms makes it so that even people with no firearms training who couldn’t get a gun normally can be given a deadly weapon and placed in a delicate situation. The fact that a tragedy often follows shouldn’t be surprising. **Malone 2/13**[[11]](#footnote-9)

More and more hospitals across the country are arming their security guards with weapons, and tragedy follows close behind when poorly trained personnel grapple with patients with mental disorders. That’s the message of an [important new piece in the New York Times](http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/14/us/hospital-guns-mental-health.html" \t "_blank). **About half of all hospitals now have guards carrying handguns,** and an almost equal number have guards with Tasers, according to the Times.  **Hospitals are already dangerous place**s, having to treat people who are combative or delusional because of their illnesses, **but the ramping up of weaponry in institutions devoted to healing is a bad trend**. It’s not just hospitals where ordinary people are at risk from guards who are supposed to protect them. **The training of gun-wielding security guards in all sorts of settings is almost comically lax**, as a year-long[investigation by the Center for Investigative Reporting](https://www.revealnews.org/article/americas-gun-toting-security-guards-may-not-be-fit-for-duty/" \t "_blank)found. **Men and women who have never fired a gun in their lives can set off on patrol** in uniform, wearing a badge and **carrying a loaded weapon**, with only a few hours of training, if any. In 15 states, **guards can openly carry guns on the job without any firearms training at all**. **Worse, the reporters found, the screening by security firms is so haphazard that guards have been hired and handed weapons that they could not have obtained on their own** because they wouldn’t pass the already weak federal screening regime. Put the hospital armed guards story together with the Center for Investigative Reporting’s work, and **you don’t need a crystal ball to see what’s going to happen when poorly trained guards confront patients who need calming professionals**, not brute force.

**Further,** banning handguns results in a cultural shift whereby hospital security staff and others would be slower to jump to violence as a solution. **LaFollette 2K** [[12]](#footnote-10)

Gun advocates disagree: they claim that cultural factors explain the correlation. Although I think they are partly correct, they draw the wrong inference. For one crucial difference between European and American cultures is the widespread presence of guns. **Each culture is the way it is**, at least in part, **because of the role guns** (or their absence) **play**ed in its creation and maintenance. Therefore, **curtailing the private possession of guns** might **well change the American culture so that it would be less violent.** Consequently, it is not only that **fewer guns** would directly cause some decline in violent crimes - which it should. It **is** also **likely to reshape the cultural values which**, along with ready availability of deadly weapons, **lead to such an extraordinarily high murder rate in America.** On the other hand, the statistical evidence that guns prevent or thwart crimes is suggestive and cannot be ignored, despite its identified weaknesses. In summary, the overall statistical evidence tilts in favor of gun control advocates, although the evidence is disputable. But we should not expect nor do we need indisputable evidence. We can act on the best evidence we have, while being open to new evidence. **If widespread availability of guns were responsible for even one-fourth of the increase in the number of murders, that would be a significant harm the state should prevent** if it could do so in a relatively unintrusive and morally acceptable way. There is little doubt that we can do that, at least to some degree. If nothing else we could control some types of guns and ammunition. To take one obvious example, teflon-coated bullets are designed to pierce protective vests. People do not use these bullets to pierce the vests on a deer or a squirrel, on a target or a skeet. They use them to pierce the vests on people, usually law enforcement officers. This ammunition has no purpose except to cause harm. Hence, we are justified in abolishing teflon bullets and in establishing severe criminal penalties for those possessing them. This would not save large numbers of lives. But, assuming this ban's enforcement is not impractical, then, if it saved even a few lives, that would be a compelling reason to outlaw such bullets. On the other hand, **some guns have a much wider use, even if they are occasionally used for ill [but].** People have seemingly legitimate uses for shotguns and single-shot rifles. Consequently, barring strong evidence to the contrary, we should not abolish them. We should, however, study their contributory role in causing harm, and explore ways we might lessen this harm in a relative unintrusive way. The central debate concerns handguns. The evidence we have shows that handguns are disproportionately used in homicides and in robberies. Although "there are approximately three times as many long guns as handguns in the US, more than 80% of gun homicides and 90% of gun robberies involve handguns (Hemenway, D. 1995: 60). The experience in Canada suggests that criminals will not switch to long guns if handguns are unavailable. **Given the special role handguns play in causing harm, we have compelling reasons to** extensively control, or perhaps even **abolish**, **handguns.**

**Thus: In The United States the private ownership of handguns should be banned in all hospitals.**

**Contention Three is the Underview:** Evaluating risk with a one percent doctrine makes life impossible – everything could theoretically cause extinction. Instead, we should focus on how to combat the everyday violence within our lives. **Meskill 09[[13]](#footnote-11)**

Tom **Friedman's piece** today in the Times on the environment (http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/09/opinion/09friedman.html?\_r=1) is one of the flimsiest pieces by a major columnist that I can remember ever reading. He **applies Cheney's "one percent doctrine"** (which is similar to the environmentalists' "precautionary principle") **to the risk of environmental armageddon.** **But this doctrine is both intellectually incoherent and practically irrelevant**. It is intellectually incoherent because **it cannot be applied consistently in a world with many potential disaster scenarios. In addition to the global-warming risk, there's also the asteroid-hitting-the-earth risk, the terrorists-with-nuclear-weapons risk** (Cheney's original scenario), **the super-duper-pandemic risk, etc. Since each of these risks,** **on the "one percent doctrine," would deserve all of our attention, we cannot address all of them simultaneously. That is, even within the one-percent mentality, we'd have to begin prioritizing, making choices and trade-offs.** But why then should we only make these trade-offs between responses to disaster scenarios? **Why not also choose between them and other**, much more cotidien, **things we value? Why treat the unlikely but cataclysmic event as somehow fundamentally different,** something that cannot be integrated into all the other calculations we make? And in fact, **this is how we behave all the time. We get into our cars in order to buy a cup of coffee, even though there's some chance we will be killed on the way to the coffee shop. We are constantly risking death, if slightly, in order to pursue the things we value. Any creature that adopted the "precautionary principle" would** sit at home - no, not even there, since there is some chance the building might collapse. That creature would **neither be able to act, nor not act,** **since it would nowhere discover perfect safety**. Friedman's approach reminds me somehow of Pascal's wager - quasi-religious faith masquerading as rational deliberation (as Hans Albert has pointed out, Pascal's wager itself doesn't add up: there may be a God, in fact, but it may turn out that He dislikes, and even damns, people who believe in him because they've calculated it's in their best interest to do so). As my friend James points out**, it's striking how descriptions of the environmental risk always describe the situation as if it were five to midnight. It must be near midnight, since otherwise there would be no need to act. But it can never be five \*past\* midnight, since then acting would be pointless and we might as well party like it was 2099. Many religious movements** - for example the early Jesus movement - **have exhibited precisely this combination of traits: the looming apocalypse, with the time (just barely) to take action.**

And, the NEG must defend the desirability of a post-fiat policy option, it’s key to limits because there are infinite potential mindset shifts vague rejections or premises held in the AFF that they could challenge or deny, forcing the conversation to be about the government is the only way to generate a predictable base of arguments that I can prepare for. **And**, Nuclear winter doesn’t cause extinction. Müller 12[[14]](#footnote-12)

Direct damage from nuclear blasts with current arsenals could reach at most a very small percentage of the world's population. Nuclear shelters would in the worst case scenario allow people to survive radiation fallout in nearby places, whose worst effects last for some days (Kearny 1987). Some of these shelters could offer protection for a long time, in the case of a nuclear winter, and some countries have strategic food provisions for many years. The effects of a nuclear winter can be compared to those of atmospheric dust caused by big asteroid impacts (Browne 1993), and would be likely smaller than that from volcanic super-eruptions (Bekki et al. 1996), in which case survival of land animals has been quite possible in the short and long term after the events. Estimates of temperature drops fall well within a range that is compatible with life and agriculture at least in the warmer regions of the Earth, with the atmospheric dust clearing up eventually (Turchin 2008). Nuclear wars seem exceedingly unlikely to constitute an existential risk, as survival of a substantial number of people would be possible under any of these conditions.**.**

And, The NEG must defend only one unconditional advocacy, key to strat skew they get to keep if I undercover or kick it if I over cover, which is unfair because I have to be strategically perfect whereas they just have to make an assessment. **And,** The state isn’t always the solution, but sometimes it is useful to engage out of necessity. Grossberg, 92**[[15]](#footnote-13)**

**The demand for moral and ideological purity often results in the rejection of any hierarchy or organization. The question-can the master's tools be used to tear down the master's house?-ignores both the contingency of the relation between such tools and the master's power and, even more importantly, the fact that there may be no other tools available. Institution**alization **is seen as a repressive impurity within the body politic rather than as a strategic and** tactical**, even empowering**, necessity**. It sometimes seems as if every progressive organization is condemned to recapitulate the same arguments and crisis, often leading to their collapse. 54 For example, Minkowitz has described a crisis in Act Up over the need for efficiency and organization, professionalization and even hierarchy,55 as if these inherently contradicted its commitment to democracy. This is particularly unfortunate since Act Up, whatever its limitations, has proven itself an effective and imaginative political strategist. The problems are obviously magnified with success, as membership, finances and activities grow.** This refusal of efficient operation **and the moment of organization** is **intimately** connected with the **Left's appropriation and** privileging of the local (as the site of **democracy and** resistance**). This is yet another reason why structures of alliance are inadequate, since they often assume that an effective movement can be organized and sustained without such structuring.** The Left needs to recognize the necessity of institutionalization **and of systems of hierarchy, without falling back into its own authoritarianism.** It needs to findreasonably democratic structures of institutionalization, even if they are impure **and compromised.**

**And**, AFF gets RVIs, on counter interps or I meets, A) its key to ensure proportional punishment on NEG T and theory since the NEG would only claim drop the debater if they were prepared to collapse to theory- that checks theory’s use as a crutch and fosters topical debate. B) No RVI lets the NEG introduce multiple NIBS which kills AFF strat because it lets them collapse to whichever is most under covered . C) 1AR time skew means I can’t cover theory and have a fair shot at substance. D) The aff can’t run T, so an RVI on T is reciprocal. **And,** Reformism is effective and brings revolutionary change closer rather than pushing it away. Delgado 9**[[16]](#footnote-14)**

The CLS critique of piecemeal reform Critical scholars reject the idea of piecemeal reform. Incremental change, they argue, merely postpones the wholesale reformation that must occur to create a decent society. Even worse, an unfair social system survives by using piecemeal reform to disguise and legitimize oppression. Those who control the system weaken resistance by pointing to the occasional concession to, or periodic court victory of, a black plaintiff or worker as evidence that the system is fair and just. In fact, Crits believe that teaching the common law or using the case method in law school is a disguised means of preaching incrementalism and thereby maintaining the current power structure.“ To avoid this, CLS scholars urge law professors to abandon the case method, give up the effort to ﬁnd rationality and order in the case law, and teach in an unabashedly political fashion. The CLS critique of piecemeal reform is familiar, imperialistic and wrong. Minorities know from bitter experience that occasional court victories do not mean the Promised Land is at hand. The critique is imperialistic in that **it** tells minorities and other oppressed peoples how they should interpret events affecting them. A court order directing a housing authority to disburse funds for heating in subsidized housing may postpone the revolution, or it may not. In the meantime, the order keeps a number of poor families warm. This may mean more to them than it does to a comfortable academic working in a warm office. It smacks of paternalism to assert that the possibility of revolution later outweighs the certainty of heat now, unless there is evidence for that possibility. The Crits do not offer such evidence. Indeed, some incremental changes may bring revolutionary changes closer, not push them further away. Not all small reforms induce complacency; some may whet the appetite for further combat. The welfare family may hold a tenants‘ union meeting in their heated living room. CLS scholars‘ critique of piecemeal reform often misses these possibilities, and neglects the question of whether total change, when it comes, will be what we want.

#### And, Abstract movements won’t produce political results besides violence – embrace the hard work of pragmatic reform. Condit 15[[17]](#footnote-15)

Thus, when Žižek and others urge us to “Act” with violence to destroy the current Reality, without a vision of an alternative, on the grounds that the links between actions and consequences are never certain, we can call his appeal both a failure of imagination and a failure of reality. As for reality, we have dozens of revolutions as models, and the historical record indicates quite clearly that they generally lead not to harmonious cooperation (what I call “AnarchoNiceness” to gently mock the romanticism of Hardt and Negri) but instead to the production of totalitarian states and/or violent factional strife. A materialist constructivist epistemology accounts for this by predicting that it is not possible for symbol-using animals to exist in a symbolic void. All symbolic movement has a trajectory, and if you have not imagined a potentially realizable alternative for that trajectory to take, then what people will leap into is biological predispositions—the first iteration of which is the rule of the strongest primate. Indeed, this is what experience with revolutions has shown to be the most probable outcome of a revolution that is merely against an Evil. The failure of imagination in such rhetorics thereby reveals itself to be critical, so it is worth pondering sources of that failure. The rhetoric of “the kill” in social theory in the past half century has repeatedly reduced to the leap into a void because the symbolized alternative that the context of the twentieth century otherwise predispositionally offers is to the binary opposite of capitalism, i.e., communism. That rhetorical option, however, has been foreclosed by the historical discrediting of the readily imagined forms of communism (e.g., Žižek9). The hard work to invent better alternatives is not as dramatically enticing as the story of the kill: such labor is piecemeal, intellectually difficult, requires multi-disciplinary understandings, and perhaps requires more creativity than the typical academic theorist can muster. In the absence of a viable alternative, the appeals to Radical Revolution seem to have been sustained by the emotional zing of the kill, in many cases amped up by the appeal of autonomy and manliness (Žižek uses the former term and deploys the ethos of the latter). But if one does not provide a viable vision that offers a reasonable chance of leaving most people better off than they are now, then Fox News has a better offering (you'll be free and you'll get rich!). A revolution posited as a void cannot succeed as a horizon of history, other than as constant local scale violent actions, perhaps connected by shifting networks we call “terrorists.” This analysis of the geo-political situation, of the onto-epistemological character of language, and of the limitations of the dominant horizon of social change indicates that the focal project for progressive Left Academics should now include the hard labor to produce alternative visions that appear materially feasible.

**And**, AFF gets reasonability: A) Checks back against theory prolif. They have bidirectional interps, and a nearly infinite number of ways to argue that the AFF is unfair, that I could never predict. B) Theory eforces a rule ex post fact so there needs to be some leeway so that debaters aren’t always getting dropped for rules they didn’t know existed. C) Competing inteprs causes a race to the bottom where debaters lose for being slightly unfair, which doesn’t do anyone any favors. **And**, Policy focus is key – lack of policy focus destroys hope for change. **Light and Katz 96**[[18]](#footnote-16)

The problematic situation of environmental ethics greatly troubles us, both as philosophers and as citizens. We are deeply concerned about the precasrious state of the natural world, the environmental hazards that threaten humans, and the maintenance of long-term sustainable life on this planet. The environmental crisis that surrounds us is a fact of experience. It is thus imperative that environmental philosophy, as a discipline, address this crisis – its meaning, its causes and its possible resolution. Can philosophers contribute anything to an investigation of environmental problems? Do the traditions, history and skills of philosophical thought have any relevance to the development of environmental policy? We believe that the answer is **yes. Despite the problematic** (and, heretofore, ineffectual) **status of environmental ethics as a practical discipline, the field has much to offer. But the fruits of this philosophical enterprise must be directed towards the practical resolution of environmental problems – environmental ethics cannot remain mired in long-running theoretical debates** in an attempt to achieve philosophical certainty. As Mark Sagoff has written: [W]e have to get along with certainty; **we have to solve practical, not theoretical, problems**; and we must adjust the ends we pursue to the means available to accomplish them. **Otherwise, method becomes an obstacle to morality, dogma the foe of deliberation, and the ideal society we aspire to in theory will become a formidable enemy of the good society we can achieve in fact.** In short, environmental **ethics must develop** for itself a methodology of environmental **pragmatism** – fueled by a recognition that **theoretical debates are problematic for the development of environmental policy**. This collection is an attempt to bring together in one place the broad range of positions encompassed by calls for an environmental pragmatism. For us, **environmental pragmatism is the open-ended inquiry into the specific real-life problems of humanity’s relationship with the environment**. The new position ranges from arguments for an environmental philosophy informed by the legacy of classical American pragmatist philosophy, to the formulation of a new basis for the reassessment of our practice through a more general pragmatist methodology.

Lastly, If the full text of the AFF is disclosed an hour before the round, don’t let the negative read a theory interp unless full text of the shell was disclosed on their wiki page at least an hour before the round. A) Solves and deters abuse because I might change my AFF strategy in order to meet your interps, also this spills over to other round because other people you debate against might do the same. This solves abuse, and lets us talk about the topic instead of talking about esoteric theory norms, that are useless outside of debate. B) Checks back against theory prolif. They have bidirectional interps, and a nearly infinite number of ways to argue that the AFF is unfair, that I could predict. Disclosure solves because it gives me a finite list of arguments you may run, that I can prepare for which checks back against bad interps that only win because they’re surprising. C) Encourages deeper theory debates, if they need to happen. If I wasn’t going to adjust my strategy then giving me an our to prep a counter interp, ensures that we actually have a well prepped argument, which is key to helping us decide as a community whether or not we think something like Nebel T is a good idea.

1. (Tommy J. Curry, Professor of Philosophy @ Texas AandM, “The Cost of a Thing: A Kingian Reformulation of a Living Wage Argument in the 21st Century,”) [↑](#footnote-ref--1)
2. [“A Conversation in Ruins: Race and Black Participation in Lincoln Douglas Debate” By Elijah J. Smith 9/4/13.] [↑](#footnote-ref-0)
3. [Rob, Professor of Sociology at Goldsmiths University of London, May, “Space, Place And Policy Regimes: The Changing Contours Of Disability And Citizenship,” *Disability, Spaces and Places of Policy Exclusion*, pg. 25-7/AKG] [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
4. [Tobin, Professor of English at the University of Michigan, Disability Aesthetics, pg. 58-63] [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
5. (Carol Appadurai and Candace A Volger, “The Critical Limits of Embodiment: Disability's Criticism”, Public Culture, Volume 13, Number 3, Fall 2011) [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
6. Rosenthal, Elisabeth. "When the Hospital Fires the Bullet." The New York Times. The New York Times, 13 Feb. 2016. Web. 28 Mar. 2016. <http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/14/us/hospital-guns-mental-health.html>. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
7. Rosenthal, Elisabeth. "When the Hospital Fires the Bullet." The New York Times. The New York Times, 13 Feb. 2016. Web. 28 Mar. 2016. <http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/14/us/hospital-guns-mental-health.html>. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
8. Rosenthal, Elisabeth. "When the Hospital Fires the Bullet." The New York Times. The New York Times, 13 Feb. 2016. Web. 28 Mar. 2016. <http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/14/us/hospital-guns-mental-health.html>. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
9. Rosenthal, Elisabeth. "When the Hospital Fires the Bullet." The New York Times. The New York Times, 13 Feb. 2016. Web. 28 Mar. 2016. <http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/14/us/hospital-guns-mental-health.html>. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
10. Rosenthal, Elisabeth. "When the Hospital Fires the Bullet." The New York Times. The New York Times, 13 Feb. 2016. Web. 28 Mar. 2016. <http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/14/us/hospital-guns-mental-health.html>. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
11. Malone, Patrick. "When Hospitals Let Guards Carry Guns, Patients Get Shot." *DC Medical Malpractice Patient Safety Blog*. N.p., 13 Feb. 2016. Web. 28 Mar. 2016. <http://www.protectpatientsblog.com/2016/02/hospitals-let-guards-carry-guns-patients-get-shot.html>. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
12. Hugh (USF St. Petersburg Philosophy Professor) “Gun Control” Ethics 110 (January 2000): 263–281 GHS CD On file [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
13. (David, professor at Colorado School of Mines and PhD from Harvard, “The "One Percent Doctrine" and Environmental Faith,” Dec 9, http://davidmeskill.blogspot.com/2009/12/one-percent-doctrine-and-environmental.html) [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
14. (Jonatas, philosophy, biology, and health science researcher. “Analysis of Existential Risks.” 2012. https://web.archive.org/web/20130912080305/http://www.jonatasmuller.com/x-risks.html)//CB [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
15. [Lawrence, Morris Davis Professor of Communication Studies at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, “We Gotta Get Out of this Place: Popular Conservatism and Postmodern Culture”, page 388-389] [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
16. [Richard, self-appointed Minority scholar, Chair of Law at the University of Alabama Law School, J.D. from the University of California, Berkeley, his books have won eight national book prizes, including six Gustavus Myers awards for outstanding book on human rights in North America, the American Library Association’s Outstanding Academic Book, and a Pulitzer Prize nomination. Professor Delgado’s teaching and writing focus on race, the legal profession, and social change, 2009, “Does Critical Legal Studies Have What Minorities Want, Arguing about Law”, p. 588-590 ] [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
17. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
18. Director of the Science, Technology and Society Program at the New Jersey Institute of Technology, teaches environmental philosophy, engineering ethics and the philosophy of technology, and a research fellow in the Environmental Health Program and Adjunct Professor of Philosophy at the University of Alberta [Andrew and Eric, “Environmental Pragmatism,” pp. 1-2] LK [↑](#footnote-ref-16)